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To be patentable, an invention must be novel, 18 useful, 19 and nonobvious. 20 The novelty requirement precludes patentability when the invention is not new. 21 The utility requirement simply "mandates that the invention be operable to achieve useful results." 22 The nonobviousness requirement prohibits patentability when the "claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious." 23 Nonobviousness is explained in more detail in the following section as this requirement is the primary concern of this paper.
24
B. § 103 obviousness
Even if an invention is novel, an inventor may not obtain a patent if the invention is obvious. 25 While the obviousness requirement was originally created at common law, 26 Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473 , 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997 ) ("To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently."). 22 In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000) .
23 Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 , 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1983 . 24 Before leaving this section, it would be a mistake not to note that on September 16, 2011 the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (hereinafter "the AIA") passed into law. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249 , 112th Cong. (2011 . While the AIA brought sweeping changes to many areas of patent law (see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leahy-Smith_America_Invents_Act (last modified Sept. 22, 2013) (stating that the AIA, among other things, switches the patent system from a "first to invent" system to a "first to file" system, and "revises and expands post-grant procedures")), these changes do not substantially effect this note's topic. The main change from the AIA that does effect this note's topic is that obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is now determined at the time of filing rather than at the time of invention. This timeframe for obviousness determination will be discussed later in this paper.
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eventually codified in 35 U.S.C. § 103 by Congress in 1952. 27 The Supreme Court has expressed the opinion that the statute was intended to codify the existing case law. 28 35 U.S.C. § 103 governs obviousness, stating:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
29
Importantly, the invention as a whole is evaluated for obviousness, not each individual element.
Basic Application of Obviousness
The Supreme Court established a framework for analyzing obviousness in Graham v.
John Deere Co. 30 Under this framework, courts are to consider "the scope and content of the prior art," 31 the "differences between the prior art and the claims at issue," 32 and "the level of 26 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851); See CRAIG A. NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 307 (2011) ("The Hotchkiss case is widely regarded as creating an additional patentability hurdle, above and beyond novelty and utility. This common law development . . . ").
27 See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) ("the Congress has for the first time expressly added a third statutory dimension to the two requirements of novelty and utility that had been the sole statutory test since the Patent Act of 1793. This is the test of obviousness . . . ").
28 Id. at 3-4 ("We have concluded that the 1952 Act was intended to codify judicial precedents embracing the principle long ago announced by this Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood . . . "). 29 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964 give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented." 34 In terms of when to measure obviousness, it is important to note that obviousness is measured "before the effective filing date of the claimed invention." 35 In asking the question of how the tools of invention can affect patentability, the level of ordinary skill is by far the most important component of this analysis, and this will be discussed more fully in the following section. Secondary considerations are also pertinent and will be discussed below in Part II.B.3.
Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art (hereinafter "PHOSITA")
Critical to the question of obviousness is how the PHOSITA is construed. There is a true paucity of case law on the topic of how to determine the PHOSITA. Nevertheless, construing the PHOSITA is essential to the question as to whether genetic algorithms can render an invention obvious.
In Eaton & Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Paste & Glue Co. 58 In this case, a patent for a "Stick-Em" glue mousetrap was challenged as obvious. 59 The patentee argued that the patent was not obvious because of commercial success. 60 The Federal Circuit ruled that the patentee had failed to establish the nexus between the patent and the commercial success because the sales data submitted was for a slightly different product than what the patent was directed to. 61 The Federal
Circuit remanded the case to the district court to consider only sales data associated with the exact patented product. This rise of genetic programs illustrates that the way many inventors do their work may change as genetic programs become more widespread. Because a genetic program may simply be able to design what an inventor tells it to, the role of the inventor will change once genetic programs are brought to that inventor's field. In the view of one scientist, people will "become managers, directing the machines toward interesting problems and opportunities . . . . The creative act will be in mentioning the right problems.'' 99 As developed in Part IV, this major change in the inventor's role leads to some situations where widespread use of genetic programs should render some ideas obvious.
IV. The Situation Where Genetic Programming Should Render an Idea Obvious
The remainder of this paper argues that before genetic programming becomes widespread in its application to the design of a particular device, designs that could be created by the genetic program should be patentable. However, once genetic programming becomes widespread in its application to the design of a particular device, designs that could be created by the genetic 97 Id. at 322-24. 98 Kohlhepp, supra note 9, at 786; Keats, supra note 91, at 68 ("An invention-machine creation has earned a patent; the examiner did not know it was the work of a computer."); see also The above argument logically demonstrates why developments designed by genetic programs in fields where genetic programming is widespread should be held obvious.
Nevertheless, just because something is logical does not make it good law or policy. Would holding such developments obvious make good policy? The following section explores this question.
A. Policy
Part II.A states patent law's goals of providing incentive for innovation and disclosure of ideas to the public. 105 Still, patents are not granted if an idea is obvious. 106 One reason for this is that obvious inventions may be brought into the public sphere without the incentive of a reward by a patent. 107 Once genetic programming has become widespread in a field, inventors working in the field can easily use a genetic program to design a device. Since the device may be developed and brought to the marketplace with such little cost, there is no need for the grant of a patent to incentivize an inventor to bring the device to the marketplace. 108 Another reason for not Vol. 29
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granting a patent to an obvious development is to avoid granting a patent to a development "achieved through some cause not attributable to the patent applicant's efforts." 109 Once a genetic program has become widespread in a field, the advances created by a genetic program are not achieved through the patent applicant's efforts-the advances are instead created by the "efforts" of the genetic program.
Further, as a practical matter, let us return to the example of a genetic program designing an antenna, and let us assume that genetic programming has become widespread in this field.
Allowing patents for antennas designed by genetic programs would allow companies to build a thicket of patents by repeatedly patenting designs created by the genetic program. Each time the genetic program is run, it would design a different antenna, since the program uses random processes. 110 If a company ran the program ten times, it could patent ten different antenna designs. If it did so, a competing company would have to go through the costly process of searching through the thicket of trivial patents. This competing company would have to shift investment dollars away from antenna research to searching though the thicket of patents.
Simply obtaining such a thicket of trivial patents would be very costly for a company.
Therefore, it could be argued that companies would likely not pursue obtaining this thicket of trivial patents because of the high cost. 111 However, this high cost is much more of a burden to smaller companies than to large ones. In other words, a large, well-funded corporation could still obtain a thicket of patents and use it effectively against a smaller company that could not afford 109 Duffy, supra note 30, at 12.
110 Kohlhepp, supra note 9, at 812.
111 See Duffy, supra note 30, at 12 (trivial patents can be discouraged by charging sufficient fees for obtaining or maintaining each patent).
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the cost of sifting through a forest of patents. Holding devices obvious in fields where the use of genetic programs is widespread would disallow a large corporation from simply paying money to obtain a thicket of patents and using it to crush smaller, less well-funded companies.
Still, it is not enough to reach the conclusion that once genetic programming is widespread in a particular field, designs created by genetic programs should be held obvious. In order to have practical application, courts must know how to determine when genetic programming has become widespread in a field.
B. A Widespread Use Test Proposal
This note proposes a four-factor test to determine if genetic programming is widespread in a field, which evaluates: 1) whether the invention was actually designed with a genetic program, 2) the proportion of PHOSITAs in the field having access to genetic programs, 3) the cost associated with the use of a genetic program for this type of design, and 4) the amount of time and effort required to operate the necessary genetic program.
Because of the dynamic nature of genetic programming and artificial intelligence, the approach taken in applying the widespread use test must be flexible. In some situations, one or more factors may predominate; in others, all factors may apply equally. This flexible approach is in accordance with factor tests for other legal concepts.
112
112 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'nsCorp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004) (analyzing, in a trademark dispute, likelihood of confusion factors and stating "courts must be flexible in applying the factors, as some may not apply. Moreover, some factors are more important than others.").
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It is important to bear in mind that 35 U.S.C. § 103 orders that obviousness is measured "before the effective filing date of the claimed invention." 113 Therefore, the widespread use test would be applied at different times for different inventions.
Factor One: If the Invention was Actually Designed by a Genetic Program
At the onset, it is important to know if the invention was designed with the use of a genetic program. At a minimum, if the invention was designed by a genetic program, it shows that the technology exists and is available to at least one inventor in the field. Further, it shows that the inventor chose to design with a genetic program, which is evidence that genetic programming simplifies the task in this context. Vol. 29
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Factor Two: The Proportion of PHOSITAs in the Field Having Access to Genetic Programs
The proportion of PHOSITAs in the field having access to genetic programs is arguably the most important factor. If a high proportion of PHOSITAs have access to genetic programs, it demonstrates that more inventors are able to implement genetic programs to bring new designs to the market place. This in itself is evidence that patent law's goal of bringing new ideas to the market place 115 is being facilitated.
One issue in analyzing this factor will be how to determine the relevant market. For example, in the domestic market for diesel powered locomotive engines, there are only two major manufacturers-General Electric Co., and Electro-Motive Diesel Inc. (now owned by Caterpillar Inc.). 116 Therefore, when analyzing this market, courts will have to determine whether to limit the market to diesel powered locomotive engines (effectively only two companies), or whether to expand the analysis to related fields (e.g. truck diesel powered engines). In this example, it is better to limit the analysis to the exact problem to be solved. This is because even though truck engines and locomotive engines may have much in common, there are enough differences that a completely different genetic program would be required to design each. In selecting fields for determining the proportion of PHOSITAs having access to genetic programs, only fields where the same genetic program could in fact be used to design the invention in question should be considered. This ensures that a PHOSITA would actually be able to use the genetic program to design the invention in question. It may seem, in the diesel 115 Nard, supra note 13, at 3. powered locomotive example, that this produces a bizarre outcome-that use by only two companies is "widespread." However, this is the correct conclusion. If only two companies produce a product, and both of these companies have access to a genetic program, then by definition every company producing this product has access to a genetic program.
Factor Three: The Financial Cost Associated with Using a Genetic Program for this
Type of Design
In designing his antenna with a genetic program, John Koza ran the genetic program on his "invention machine," which is 1000 computers networked together. 117 The electric bill alone was $3,000 a month. 118 The high cost of gathering and assembling 1000 computers may provide deterrence for many inventors and companies from adopting genetic programs. Therefore, a high cost of running a genetic program would be evidence that genetic programming was not widespread in a field. Alternatively, if a genetic program could be run cheaply, this would show that companies could easily adopt them and that use was becoming widespread.
Factor Four: The Amount of Time and Effort Required to Operate the Necessary Genetic Program
Along with financial cost, the time and effort required to operate the genetic program should also be considered. 119 The time and effort necessary to network enough computers together to provide the computing capability needed to run some genetic programs could 117 Keats, supra note 91, at 68-70.
118 Id. at 69.
119 Although a high financial cost of running a genetic program will often go hand in hand with a large requirement of time and effort to run a genetic program, this is not always the case. The two could become especially separated in the future as computer processors improve. For example, if improved computer processors allow a genetic program to run on a PC, but a genetic program software licensor still charges a very high fee for using the genetic program.
preclude some inventors from using genetic programs. Further, at the point in time when John Koza designed his antenna, his system took from one day to one month to create a new invention. 120 A month is quite a long time for a computer program to run. Alternatively, if a genetic program could be run as quickly as an iPhone app, this would be evidence that genetic programming is widespread in a field.
V. Contra
Above, I argue that when genetic programming becomes widespread with regard to designing a particular product, designs that the genetic program could produce should be obvious and therefore unpatentable. Yet, there are multiple potential counter arguments to this proposal in different directions. It is possible to argue that anything created by a genetic program should be obvious, even before genetic programming has become widespread in a field. Conversely, it is possible to argue that even widespread use of genetic programming should not render an idea obvious. Finally, there is an argument that widespread use of genetic programming should create only a prima facie case of obviousness. The strongest contra is discussed below.
A. Argument that Nothing Designed by a Genetic Program Should be Patentable Because it was Designed by a Process of Trial and Error
One argument is that everything designed by a genetic program should be held obvious because genetic programs (it appears) operate by a process of trial and error. The trial and error argument assumes that if something can be discovered through a simple process of trial and error, it must be obvious. is not clear that the use of trial and error should render an idea obvious.
Federal Circuit Judge's belief was that "an approach that is obvious to try is also obvious where normal trial and error procedures will lead to the result"). it makes perfect sense that before genetic programs became widespread in his field, Koza would be granted a patent on his device. Likewise, it makes perfect sense that after genetic programs became widespread in his field, Koza would be denied a patent on his device.
C. Should Widespread use Create only a Prima Facie Case of Obviousness?
An alternative proposal to the one in this note is that a finding of widespread use should create only a prima facie case of obviousness. The idea is that the prima facie case of obviousness could be rebutted using secondary considerations. Commercial success is also not relevant in the context of widespread genetic programming. The Federal Circuit explains that commercial success "presumes an idea would successfully have been brought to market sooner, in response to market forces, had the idea been obvious to persons skilled in the art." 134 This is less applicable to our question because once genetic programming has become widespread in a field, it becomes obvious for a PHOSITA to use a genetic program to bring a product to market. Therefore, the presumption that a product would have been brought to the market sooner no longer makes any sense where genetic programming has become widespread. A presumption that the product will be designed using a genetic program, and immediately brought to the market makes more sense in this context.
None of the secondary considerations are relevant to the problems posed by widespread genetic programming. Therefore, after finding widespread use, creating a prima facie case of obviousness instead of simply finding obviousness would not be advisable.
VI. Conclusion
No one knows how genetic programming will affect the future of invention and the patentability of devices designed by genetic programs. Thus far, at least one device that was designed by a genetic program has been patented. 135 This is fine for now, as use of genetic programming is not widespread. In the future, however, as engineers begin to make common use of genetic programming, many designs that were once difficult to create will become trivially 136 If patents were granted on these designs, the public would gain nothing from these patent grants because a PHOSITA could already easily bring this technology to the marketplace. Because this situation only occurs after genetic program use becomes widespread in a particular field, finding a method to determine widespread use is critically important. This note has proposed a four-factor widespread use test to make this determination. There is no doubt that genetic programs have the potential to change invention and creative thinking as we know it. 137 As this sea change arrives, we must be ready to adapt our patent laws to maintain their underlying purpose.
136 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2013).
